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Anti-Lapse Statute Must Apply to a Lapsed
Residuary Bequest in the Absence of Reasonably
Certain Intent of the Testator: In re Estate of
Burger
PENNSYLVANIA
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
STATUTE - FAILED RESIDUARY BEQUEST - The

-

ANTI-LAPSE

Pennsylvania Su-

preme Court held that an intestate heir lacked standing to challenge a residuary bequest in a will contest because, in the absence
of the testator's contrary intent, the anti-lapse statute applied to
direct the failed bequest to the other residuary legatees.
In re Estate of Burger, 898 A.2d 547 (Pa. 2006).
Dr. Regis F. Burger died in November 2002, leaving an estate
valued at over $2.5 million.'
Burger's final will, which was
drafted in March 2000, named the five heirs of his deceased sister
as beneficiaries. 2 Each beneficiary was designated a portion of the
residue of Burger's estate, Linda Nash being allotted the largest
share.3 The residuary clause 4 in the final will was similar to
clauses contained in Burger's prior two wills, except that those
wills granted Nash a smaller percentage of the residuary estate. 5
Janice B. Leckey, Burger's niece, petitioned to have the will set
aside in part, averring that the 25% increase in Nash's bequest
was procured through undue influence. 6 Consequently, Leckey
1.
2.
3.

In re Estate of Burger, 898 A.2d 547, 548 (Pa. 2006).
Burger, 898 A.2d at 548.
Id. The seventh paragraph of the will provided as follows:
I give 50% of my residuary estate to LINDA NASH, 120 Bingay Drive, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15237. If LINDA NASH does not survive me, the assets
which would have been distributed to her had she survived me shall be distributed proportionally to the other persons entitled to distribution pursuant to
this paragraph SEVENTH.

Id.
4. A residuary clause is defined as "a testamentary clause that disposes of any estate
property remaining after the satisfaction of all other gifts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1336
(8th ed. 2004).
5. Burger, 898 A.2d at 548. Burger had increased Nash's share of the residuary estate
from 25% in his 1998 will, to 34% in his 1999 will and finally to 50% in his 2000 will. Id.
Another significant change made to the final will was the appointment of Nash as executrix. Id.
6. Id. Along with the increased bequest, Leckey also cited, as further evidence of
undue influence, the fact that, at the end of 1999 when Burger's physical and mental health
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argued that the 25% increase in the residuary bequest was void,
resulting in partial intestacy 7 from which Leckey would benefit as
the person in the nearest degree of consanguinity8 to Burger. 9
Nash objected to Leckey's petition by way of demurrer,10 asserting that Leckey lacked standing to pursue the will contest because
she was not a beneficiary of Burger's will, which disposed of his
entire estate.'1 Further adducing Leckey's lack of standing, Nash
argued that, even if the will was found to be invalid in part,
Leckey would not benefit as an intestate heir because the will provided for a substitutional gift (also referred to hereinafter as a
"substitute disposition") 1 2 of Nash's residuary bequest. 13 Although the substitute disposition of the bequest was predicated
upon a beneficiary predeceasing Burger, Nash asserted that Burger's intent was that the same substitute disposition should take
effect if the gift failed for any other reason. 14
Nash further supported her argument with a rule of interpretation established by section 2514 of the Pennsylvania Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code (hereinafter "Code"), 15 which supplied
the default provision stating that the will should control the disposition of his property in the absence of the testator's contrary
intent. 16 Title 20, section 2514(11) 17 of the Code (hereinafter
18
"clause (11)"), the purpose of which is to avoid partial intestacy,
reads as follows:
Lapsed and void devises and legacies; shares in residue.-When a devise or bequest as described in clause (10) hereof
shall be included in a residuary clause of the will and shall
had declined, Nash had been granted a broad power of attorney, took control of Burger's
finances and fired his full-time caregiver. Id.
7. Intestacy is "the state or condition of a person's having died without a valid will."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (8th ed. 2004).
8. Consanguinity is defined as "the relationship of persons of the same blood or origin." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (8th ed. 2004).
9. Burger, 898 A.2d at 548-49.
10. A demurrer is "a pleading stating that although the facts alleged in a complaint
may be true, they are insufficient for the plaintiff to state a claim for relief and for the
defendant to frame an answer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 465 (8th ed. 2004).
11. Burger, 898 A.2d at 549.
12. A substitutional gift is defined as "a testamentary gift to one person in place of
another who is unable to take under the will for some reason." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
710 (8th ed. 2004).
13. Burger, 898 A.2d at 549.
14. Id.
15. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2514 (2005).
16. Burger, 898 A.2d at 549.
17.

20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2514(11).

18.

Burger, 898 A.2d at 549.
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not be available to the issue of the devisee or legatee under
the provision of clause (9) hereof, and if the disposition shall
not be otherwise expressly provided for by law, it shall pass to
the other residuary devisees or legatees, if any there be, in
proportion to their respective shares or interests in the residue.19
Nash proposed that clause (11) directed any failed bequest, including a residuary share, to be distributed to the remaining re20
siduary legatees.
In opposition, Leckey argued that clause (11)'s reference to title
20, section 2514(10)21 (hereinafter "clause (10)") precludes clause
(11) from applying to Nash's residuary bequest. 22 Clause (10) prescribes as follows:
Lapsed and void devises and legacies; shares not in residue.-A devise or bequest not being part of the residuary estate
which shall fail or be void because the beneficiary fails to survive the testator or because it is contrary to law or otherwise
incapable of taking effect or which has been revoked by the testator or is undisposed of or is released or disclaimed by the
beneficiary, if it shall not pass to the issue of the beneficiary
under the provisions of clause (9) hereof, and if the disposition
thereof shall not be otherwise expressly provided for by law,
shall be included in the residuary devise or bequest, if any,
23
contained in the will.
Leckey asserted that clause (11) specifically states that it is only
applicable to those bequests described in clause (10).24 She concluded that, since clause (10) only refers to void specific bequests
and devises, 25 clause (11) necessarily could not apply to a void residuary bequest. 26

19. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2514(11) (emphasis added).
20. Burger, 898 A.2d at 549.
21. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2514(10).
22. Burger, 898 A.2d at 549-50.
23. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2514(10) (emphasis added).
24. Burger, 898 A.2d at 549-50.
25. A specific devise is defined as "a devise that passes a particular piece of property."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (8th ed. 2004).
26. Burger, 898 A.2d at 550. Leckey's argument, as noted in her Brief in Opposition to
Preliminary Objections, was that "the Rule in clause (11) of the section, by its terms, applies to bequests which were originally not part of the Residuary, but, by the provisions of
clause (10), are made part of the Residuary." Id.
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In an unpublished opinion, the Pennsylvania Court of Common
Pleas, Orphans' Division, agreed that Leckey lacked standing to
pursue the will contest. 27 Judge Kelly noted that Leckey's interpretation of the Code ignored the plain meaning of the headings of

clause (10)28 and clause

(11).29

The court interpreted clause (11)'s

reference to clause (10) as merely setting forth the reasons why a
bequest may fail to residuary devises, not, as Leckey argued, re30
quiring a specific devise in order to activate clause (11).
However, the court's interpretation of clause (10) and clause
(11) was not dispositive, because the majority found Burger's alternative disposition of the residuary bequest in the event of
Nash's death to be sufficient evidence of the intent to have the
same distribution if the gift failed for any other reason. 31 Thus,
the court concluded that even if undue influence was proven,
Leckey still lacked standing because the language of the will was
evidence of Burger's intent to avoid intestacy.32
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision that Leckey lacked standing. 33 Judge Johnson noted the general presumption in Pennsylvania against intestacy, 34 mentioning
that title 20, section 2514 of the Code, particularly the anti-lapse
and void legacy provisions, operates consistently with this presumption. 35 Central to the superior court's reasoning was the notion that a testator's intent to have his will dispose of his property
did not have to be express, 36 but need only appear with "reason' 37
able certainty.
The court found Burger's inclusion of substitute provisions for
the distribution of the residuary bequests evinced the requisite
27. Id.
28. Id. The heading of clause (10) is "lapsed and void devises and legacies; shares not
in residue." Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id. The heading of clause (11) is "lapsed and void devises and legacies; shares in
residue." Id.
30. Id.
31. Burger,898 A.2d at 550.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See In re Estate of Hill, 247 A.2d 606, 609 (Pa. 1968), stating:
"[W]hen a decedent drafts a last will and testament, he is presumed, in the absence of an indication to the contrary, to have intended to dispose of his entire
estate and not to die intestate as to any part of it" and a construction should be
adopted that would avoid an intestacy unless such construction would do violence to the language of the will ....
Id. (quoting In re Estate of Farrington, 220 A.2d 790, 793 (Pa. 1966)).
35. Burger, 898 A.2d at 550-51.
36. Id. at 551 (citing In re Estate of Corbett, 241 A.2d 524, 527 (Pa. 1968)).
37. Id. (citing Estate of Kehler, 411 A.2d 748, 750 (Pa. 1980)).
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reasonably certain intent to dispose of his property by will, not
through the application of the anti-lapse statute. 38 Consequently,
the majority found no reason to support Leckey's argument that if
the bequest failed due to undue influence then the alternate disposition would not apply. 39 In holding that Burger's intent to dispose of his entire estate through his will was reasonably certain,
the court declined to address the interpretation of section
2514(11).40
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur 4l upon
Leckey's appeal of the superior court's decision. 42 Justice Saylor
delivered the majority opinion for the court. 43 After summarizing
the parties' arguments, the court addressed the superior court's
44
reasons for denying Leckey standing to contest the will.
Justice Saylor stated that the superior court's reliance on Burger's specification for an alternate disposition of the residuary estate was in tension with previous Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decisions. 45 When compared with this authority, it was clear that
the superior court could not have been justified when it divined
Burger's intent based upon the language of the will coupled with
surrounding circumstances. 46 The majority asserted that the superior court must have relied upon a judicial presumption in order
to have arrived at its result. 47

38.
39.

Id.
Id. The majority reasoned that:
Whether a testator's bequest 'lapses" because the beneficiary has predeceased
him, or has failed for some other reason, the testator's expression of intent for
the disposition of the affected property remains to be honored to the extent possible. Thus, if a bequest fails, (albeit under a scenario less common than the
beneficiary's death) and an alternative disposition is specified, we cannot presume that had the bequest failed for a different reason the testator's intent for
the descent of the property to someone else would change.
Id. (quoting In re Estate of Burger, 852 A.2d 385, 390 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), af'd, 898 A.2d
547 (Pa. 2005)).
40. Burger, 898 A.2d at 552.
41. Allocatur is the Latin phrase for "it is allowed... [and] is still used in Pennsylvania
to denote permission to appeal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (8th ed. 2004).
42. In re Estate of Burger, 872 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2005).
43. Burger, 898 A.2d at 548 (Chief Justice Cappy and Justices Castille and Baer joined
in the majority opinion. Justice Eakin filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Newman
joined).
44. Id. at 553.
45. Id. The court disagreed with the superior court's reasoning because "a circumstance-specific, alternative bequest is not, in and of itself, sufficient to support a substitute
gift occasioned by a different circumstance, at least in the absence of some additional presumption." Id.
46. Id. at 554.
47. Id. Justice Saylor noted that the court does not:
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Justice Saylor noted that the need for judicial presumptions
when interpreting wills containing ambiguities was precisely the
reason the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted section 2514.48 Because of the extensive disagreement regarding which presumptions were appropriate, the court found it most reasonable to follow the direction of the Legislature by applying the current statutory presumptions. 49 For these reasons, the majority held that the
superior court erred in precluding the application of section 2514
when it found that Burger's intent was reasonably certain based
exclusively on the will's provision for a substitute gift should Nash
50
predecease him.
Having concluded that the superior court's dismissal of a statutory interpretation of section 2514 was improper, Justice Saylor
discussed the proper interpretation of the statute. 51 Justice Saylor stated that, since clause (11) purported to pertain only to the
lapsed and void special devises addressed in clause (10), Leckey's
argument appears to be valid on its face. 52 However, as the court
noted, clause (11)'s cross-reference was meant to apply to clause
53
If
(10) in its entirety, not just an isolated portion thereof.
Leckey's interpretation of section 2514 was given effect, clause
(11) would be rendered superfluous, as both clauses (10) and (11)

[R]egard this presumption as necessarily unreasonable; indeed, the result of its
application (a substitute gift to the other residuary beneficiaries) is precisely
the same result obtaining upon applying the presumption of clause (11) of Section 2514 as its language has been interpreted in prior decisions of this court,
by the orphan's court, and by Appellee herein.
Id. (citation omitted).
48. Burger, 898 A.2d at 555.
49. Id. The majority believed that "the interests of justice would be better served" by
implementing the "legislatively prescribed rules of interpretation that were available to the
testator for consideration at the time that the will was drafted, as opposed to crafting subsequent, judicial presumptions that are independent of the statute." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. However, the court noted that Leckey's interpretation cannot survive application to the remainder of the statute. Id. The court stated:
[Leckey's view] appears to be that the requirement for the gifts covered by
clause (11) to be included within the residuary clause of the will merely reflects
a legislative conception that lapsed or void particular devises or legacies would
fall within the residuary by operation of clause (10) upon lapse or invalidation
of the gift.
Id. at 555 n.11. The court disagreed with this interpretation because clause (11) "speaks
directly to the subject matter of the actual 'residuary clause,' [Leckey's] view does not reflect the same literal approach to the statute that she seeks to have applied to another of its
parts." Id. (internal citations omitted).
53. Burger, 898 A.2d at 556.
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would apply to non-residuary gifts and section 2514 would be left
54
without a provision for the disposition of residuary gifts.
Due to the apparent inconsistencies presented by the interpretation of clause (11), the court found it necessary to apply principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity of the statute. 55 In doing so, the court noted that the creation of section
2514, the language of which was modeled after the Uniform Probate Code,5 6 was the result of the General Assembly wishing to
57
move away from the common law doctrines favoring intestacy.
Consistent with this notion was the court's interpretation that
clause (11), when read in its entirety, 58 directs courts to apply a
59
presumption avoiding lapsed gifts that result in intestacy.
The majority understood this interpretation of the statute to be
in line with previous decisions involving the interpretation of
clause (10) of section 14 of the Wills Act of 1947 (hereinafter "1947
Act"),6 0 the language of which is nearly identical to clause (11).61
In the case of In re Estate of McLaughlin,6 2 an equally divided supreme court reasoned that clause (10) of the 1947 Act worked to
enlarge the shares of residuary beneficiaries when a testator
failed to provide for a complete distribution of his estate. 63 The
supreme court remained consistent in deciding In re Estate of Corbett 64 and In re Slater's Estate,65 where it held that the same re54. Brief of Appellee at 14, Burger, 898 A.2d 547 (No. 62 WAP 2005).
55. Burger, 898 A.2d at 556. In interpreting the statute, the majority relied upon the
"principle of liberal construction to promote the remedial statute's objects." Id. See 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1928(c) (2006). The court also relied on "the authorization to consider the
occasion and necessity for the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the consequences of a
particular interpretation, and former laws." Burger, 898 A.2d at 556. See 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1921 (2006). Finally, the majority found it necessary to "consider the headings
included by the General Assembly as an aid." Burger, 898 A.2d at 556. See 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1924 (2006).
56. Burger, 898 A.2d at 556-57. The court compared section 2514(11) to section 2-606
of the Uniform Probate Code, which states that when a residuary gift fails, the "share
passes to the other residuary devisee, or to other residuary devisees in proportion to their
interests in the residue." Id. (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606 (1969)).
57. Id. (citing 80 AM. JUR. 2d Wills § 1445 (2005)).
58. Id. The court considered the "heading, the bulk of its body, and the policy" that
section 2514 was meant to serve in its interpretation of the statute. Id.
59. Id. The majority noted that most jurisdictions follow the Uniform Probate Code's
recommendation of adopting presumptions that disfavor intestacy. Id. These judicial presumptions have been "particularly strong where the subject of the gift is the residuary
estate." Id. (citing 80 AM. JUR. 2d Wills § 1037 (2005)).
60. 1947 Pa. Laws 89 (amended 1970).
61. Burger, 898 A.2d at 557.
62. 273 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1971).
63. Burger, 898 A.2d at 552 (citing McLaughlin, 273 A.2d at 744-45).
64. 241 A.2d 524 (Pa. 1968).
65. 105 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1954).
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sult should occur when the statute is applied to a lapsed bequest.66

In accordance with these prior decisions and the leading presumptions in favor of avoiding intestacy, the court stated that the
General Assembly intended clause (11) to provide the presumption
for lapsed and failed residuary bequests in the absence of the testator's reasonably certain intent. 67 Consequently, because the
majority did not find Burger's intent to be reasonably certain, if
the will was invalidated due to undue influence, clause (11)'s presumption would direct the substitute gift to the other residuary
beneficiaries, not to Leckey, the intestate heir. 68 Since Leckey
would not benefit from a finding that Burger was unduly influenced, the court held that she lacked standing to contest the
will. 69
Justice Eakin concurred with the majority, denying Leckey
standing to challenge the will. 70 However, he agreed with the superior court's finding that Burger's intent was reasonably certain,
making the interpretation of clause (11) unnecessary. 71 Justice
Eakin argued that there was enough evidence from the prior wills
and surrounding circumstances to discern Burger's intent with
reasonable certainty.72 The fact that Burger did not provide for a
substitute gift in the event of undue influence, Justice Eakin argued, is not surprising in light of the fact that most people do not
believe they are being unduly influenced during the drafting of
73
their will.
Moreover, Justice Eakin noted that a provision of the will provided that beneficiaries could forfeit their share by failing to attend Burger's funeral.74 Justice Eakin argued that, since Burger
66. Burger, 898 A.2d at 552 n.5 (citing Corbett, 241 A.2d at 527; Slater, 105 A.2d at 61).
67. Id. at 557.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (Eakin, J., concurring). Justice Newman joined Justice Eakin's concurring
opinion. Id.
71. Burger, 898 A.2d at 558 (Eakin, J. concurring).
72. Id. Justice Eakin believed that Burger's intent can be derived from the fact that
Leckey:
does not challenge her inclusion as a residuary beneficiary, nor Dr. Burger's
capacity to provide for her in that way. Looking at the prior wills, where no
undue influence was claimed, we see consistent inclusion of [Nash], who was
involved with decedent's care in his waning years. He consistently provided for
[Nash], and he consistently chose not to provide for [Leckey] or other intestate
heirs.

Id.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 559.
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directed these forfeited shares into the residuary estate, it is not
unlikely that he intended the same result in the event that a beneficiary's share failed for any other reason. 75 For these reasons, the
concurrence found that it was reasonably certain that Burger intended failed bequests to pass to the other residuary legatees, not
to have clause (11) control the distribution of his estate. 76
At common law, a legacy or devise was considered to have
lapsed if the beneficiary died before the testator. 77 A gift was also
considered to have lapsed when circumstances other than death of
the beneficiary caused the devise or legacy to fail. 78 Traditionally,
a lapsed specific devise fell into the residuary estate, but if there
was no residuary estate, the devise passed by intestacy. 79 How80
ever, this was not true of lapsed residuary
bequests, which im8'
heirs.
intestate
the
to
mediately passed
In Reed's Estate,8 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined a
will in which General Reed divided his residuary estate as follows:
one-third to his wife, one-third to his two sons, one-sixth to his
daughter and the final one-sixth to his two grandchildren.8 3
Reed's daughter predeceased him, causing her residuary bequest
to lapse.8 4 Applying the common law rule, the court ordered that
this lapsed bequest pass by intestacy.8 5 Consequently, Reed's
widow was entitled to the lapsed residuary share as his spouse
86
and closest kin.
75. Id.
76. Burger,898 A.2d at 559 (Eakin, J., concurring).
77. PAGE ON WILLS § 50.10 (William J. Bowe et al. eds., 2003).
78. 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1825 (2001). See also PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 77, § 50.1 ("By
derivation 'lapse' means falling from the original condition because of subsequent events,
by which that which was valid originally thereafter fails. With this underlying meaning, it
might be used of devises and legacies to indicate any of the different ways, [other than
death], in which they fail.").
79. 80 AM. JUR. 2d Wills § 1445 (2005).
80. A residuarydevise is defined as "a devise of the remainder of the testator's property
left after other specific devises are taken." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (8th ed. 2004).
81. 80 AM. JUR. 2d Wills § 1446.
82. 82 Pa. 428 (1876).
83. Reed, 82 Pa. at 428.
84. Id. at 429.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 431. The court reasoned that:
The death of any one or more of the other residuary legatees did not lessen or
deprive [Reed's widow] of her proportion of the residue under the will, but simply changed the distribution of the part left without an owner by reason of the
death of the legatee of it in the lifetime of the testator. This lapsed legacy ...
became distributable under the intestate law, as part of the estate not disposed
of by the will, when it took effect by and at the death of the testator. Of this he
died intestate.
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Almost two decades later, the common law doctrine employed by
the court in Reed's Estate became the subject of repeated criticism
due to the unsound reasoning behind its application.8 7 In 1892,
Justice Mitchell of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
[T]he [intestate succession] rule thus established does not
commend itself to sound reasoning, and is a sacrifice of the
settled presumption that a testator does not mean to die intestate as to any portion of his estate, and also of his plain actual intent, shown in the appointment of general residuary
legatees, that his next of kin shall not participate in the distribution at all. The rule is in fact a concession to the set policy of English law, nowhere more severely asserted than in
chancery, to keep the devolution of property in the regular
channels, to the heir, and the next of kin, whenever it can be
8
done.8
In order to abrogate the harshness of the common law doctrine
favoring intestacy, the Pennsylvania Legislature adopted an antilapse statute, 89 which currently applies to both specific and residuary devises. 90 Consequently, the anti-lapse statute will be
rendered inoperative only when a decedent dies intestate, or when
it appears from the language of a decedent's will that he wished
for a gift to pass to his next of kin only under certain circumstances. 91
Nevertheless, even if a testator's will leaves
"[d]irections for devolution in case of the failure of gifts for certain

87.

PAGE ON WILLS, supranote 77, § 50.18.
In some cases the rule has been criticized quite sharply, on the ground, among
others, that it defeats testator's intention in more cases than it gives effect
thereto. In some states the courts have held the general rule to be unsound;
and have taken the position that a lapsed residue becomes a part of the residue; and passes to the remaining residuary legatees.

Id.
88. In re Gray's Estate, 23 A. 205, 206 (Pa. 1892).
89. In re Estate of Burger, 898 A.2d 547, 556 (Pa. 2006) (citing 80 AM. JUR. 2d Wills §
1445 (2005)).
90. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2514(10)-(11) (2005). See also 97 C.J.S. Wills section 1834
(2006), which states:
In enacting a statute providing that any residuary bequest which fails, is void,
or is revoked shall pass to and be divided among the other legatees in proportion to their respective interests, the intent of the legislature is to prevent void
or lapsed legacies from passing to the next of kin or heirs and to carry out the
testator's intent.

Id.
91.

97 C.J.S. Wills § 1825 (2006).
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specified reasons . . . [this direction] will not apply where a gift
92
fails for a reason not enumerated by the testator.
However, Pennsylvania did not always have a provision specifi93
cally addressing the devolution of lapsed residuary bequests.
Anti-lapse provisions concerning the residuary estate were first
enacted by the Wills Act of 1844, which included sections prevent94
ing the lapse of residuary bequests to siblings of the testator.
More than seven decades later, Pennsylvania enacted the Wills
Act of 1917 (hereinafter "1917 Act"), which included a provision
preventing the lapse of residuary devises to beneficiaries other
than siblings of the testator. 95 Ever since the enactment of the
1917 Act, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently interpreted anti-lapse statutes as directing the devolution of such
lapsed residuary bequests to the remaining residuary beneficiaries. 96
In Desh's Estate,97 the testatrix left the residue of her estate to
her two brothers, Harvey and George Desh. 98 George Desh predeceased the testatrix and was survived by his two sons. 99 The auditing judge awarded one-half of the estate to Harvey Desh, the
surviving brother, and the other one-half to the two sons of the
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Desh's Estate, 184 A. 111, 111-12 (Pa. 1936).
1844 Pa. Laws 564 (repealed 1917).
1917 Pa. Laws 403 (amended 1999). Section 15(c) of the Act stated:
Unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will, such real or personal estate, or interests therein, as shall be comprised or intended to be comprised in
any devise or bequest in such will contained, which shall fail or be void by reason of the death of the devisee or legatee in the lifetime of the testator, or by
reason of such devise or bequest being contrary to law, or otherwise incapable
of taking effect, or which shall be revoked by the testator, shall be included in
the residuary devise or bequest, if any, contained in such will. In any case
where such devise or bequest which shall fail or be void, or shall be revoked as
aforesaid, shall be contained in the residuary clause of such will, it shall pass
to and be divided among the other residuary devisees or legatees, if any there
be, in proportion to their respective interests in such residue.

Id.
96. See In re Estate of Burger, 898 A.2d 547, 557 (Pa. 2006) (interpreting section
2514(11) of title 20 of the Code as applying to a lapsed residuary bequest in the absence of
reasonable certainty concerning the intent of the testator); In re Estate of McLaughlin, 273
A.2d 742, 744-45 (Pa. 1971) (interpreting Section (10) of the Wills Act of 1947 as enhancing
the shares of the residuary beneficiaries upon a failure of a complete disposition of the
residuary estate); Armstrong Estate, 31 A.2d 528, 529 (Pa. 1943) (holding that section 15(c)
of the Wills Act of 1917's "purpose was to abolish that common-law rule as to lapse ... and
thus prevent a lapse where it was apparent that the testatrix intended not to give the next
of kin any interest in her estate").
97. Desh, 184 A. at 111.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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0 Harvey Desh appealed,
deceased George Desh. 10
claiming that he
was entitled to the entire residue according to section 15(c) of the
1917 Act. 101
The issue presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
whether the residuary legacy, which failed due to the death of the
testatrix's brother, should pass to the issue of the legatee under
section 15(b) of the 1917 Act or to Harvey Desh, the surviving residuary legatee, under section 15(c) of the same act.102 Chief Justice Kephart first described the existing interpretation of section
15(b). 103 Standing alone, 15(b) would control the disposition of the
estate because "its purpose was to prevent intestacy or lapse and
to give to lineal descendants of a brother or sister of a testator dying before him the property which he intended their ancestor to
104
get, if living."'
The court then addressed the question of whether the Legislature's recent addition of subsection 15, subparagraph (c) had any
effect on the application of 15(b).105 Justice Kephart explained
that the Legislature enacted section 15(c) to cover "entirely new
subject-matter which could only operate if the devise or legacy did
not come within section 15(a) 10 6 or (b)." 10 7 The Chief Justice explained that section 15(c) was enacted as a response to criticism of
the common law rule, which directed the devolution of lapsed residuary bequests to intestate heirs.' 0 8 However, the court reasoned that section 15(c) should not be construed to include a residuary gift to a brother or a sister, since such gifts were already
addressed by section 15(b). 10 9 The court concluded that since the
lapsed residuary bequest was given to the testatrix's brother, section 15(b) should apply because the purpose of 15(c) "was not to
cover a situation of intestacy previously provided for, but to cover
one formerly untouched by legislation."'' 10

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Desh, 184 A. at 111.
103. Id. at 112.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 1917 Pa. Laws 403 (amended 1999). Section 15(a) of the Wills Act of 1917 is the
provision preventing the lapse of devises or bequests given to the children and other lineal
descendents of the testator. Id.
107. Desh, 184 A. at 112.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 113.
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In re Slater's Estate also raised the question of the devolution of
a lapsed residuary devise. "' There, the testator left two-thirds of
his residuary estate to his cousin, Mary Aber, and the remaining
one-third to be divided between Ralph and Alice Canon, also his
cousins. 112 Alice Canon predeceased the testator, causing her residuary bequest to lapse. 113 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stearne stated that the Legislature had enacted various statutes
to control the disposition of lapsed residuary bequests. 1 4 He
noted that the culmination of these various statutes117lies in the
1947 Act,11 5 section 14(10),116 which applied in Slater.
Originally, Mary Aber was given two-thirds of the residuary estate and Ralph Canon was given one-sixth of the residuary estate,
which proportionately equaled four-fifths and one-fifth, respectively, of the residuary estate."18 Consequently, in applying section 14(10), the court held that Alice Canon's lapsed one-sixth
share of the residuary was to be divided in accordance with these
proportions between the two surviving residuary legatees. 119
In re Estate of Corbett was another case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted section 14(10) of the 1947 Act to
direct the devolution of a lapsed residuary bequest to the surviving residuary legatees. 20 This case involved a will contest between the surviving heir of a residuary legatee and two intestate
heirs.' 21 Dennis A. Corbett bequeathed his residuary estate
equally to his brother and two sisters, "who [were] instructed as to
[his] charitable wishes."'122 All three of the named beneficiaries
predeceased the testator.123 The two sisters were unmarried and
died without issue, while the brother was survived by his adopted
111. In re Slater's Estate, 105 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1954).
112. Slater, 105 A.2d at 60.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 61.
115. 1947 Pa. Laws 89 (amended 1970).
116. Id. Section 14(10) of the Wills Act of 1947 stated:
Lapsed and void devises and legacies.--Shares in residue. When a devise or bequest . . .shall be included in a residuary clause of the will and shall not be
available to the issue of the devisee or legatee under the provisions of clause (8)
hereof, . . . it shall pass to the other residuary devisees or legatees, if any there
be, in proportion to their respective shares or interests in the residue.
Id.
117. Slater, 105 A.2d at 61.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 62.
120. In re Estate of Corbett, 241 A.2d 524 (Pa. 1968).
121. Corbett, 241 A.2d at 525.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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son, James Corbett.124 Dennis Corbett had another brother, not
mentioned in the will, who died one year before the execution of
the will and was survived by two daughters, Mae Corbett and
25
Margaret Suria. 1
The question presented to the court was whether the residuary
estate should have passed in its entirety to James Corbett, as was
held by the auditing judge, or if the estate should have passed
through intestacy, with James Corbett, Mae Corbett and Margaret
Suria taking equal shares.126 The court noted that if the statute
was to be applied, "since the lapsed bequests to testator's sisters
were contained in a residuary clause, subsection (10) dictate[d]
that [James Corbett], whose father's bequest did not lapse, [would
be] entitled to the entire residue." 127 However, the two nieces argued that since the will contained the phrase "who are instructed
as to my charitable wishes," the intent of the testator was that the
named beneficiaries were only to take in the event that they survived the testator. 128 The court stated that this argument could be
reduced to the proposition that this phrase demonstrated Dennis
Corbett's implied intent that the anti-lapse statute should not ap29
ply. 1
The majority disagreed that this language was sufficient to
show that the testator's intent was to prevent the application of
the anti-lapse statute.130 Justice Roberts noted that Pennsylvania
courts had consistently held that the statute may only be rendered
inoperative when the testator specifically provided for an alternative disposition in the event of a contingency.1 31 Because Dennis
Corbett's will did not include language amounting to sufficient
intent to render the statute inoperative, the court held that the
entire residuary estate, in accordance with section 14(10), should
pass to James Corbett, the surviving heir of a residuary legatee. 132
Three years later, the court decided In re Estate of McLaughlin
and faced an additional question requiring the interpretation of
section 14(10) of the 1947 Act. 133 In McLaughlin, the fifth para-

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Corbett, 241 A.2d at 525.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527.
Id.
Corbett, 241 A.2d at 527.
Id. at 528.
In re Estate of McLaughlin, 273 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1971).
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graph of Viola S. McLaughlin's will provided that "all of the rest,
residue and remainder of [her] estate" was to be distributed to five
named beneficiaries. 134 The will then devised 10% of the residuary estate to each of four named beneficiaries and the "remaining"
50% to a fifth beneficiary, the First Presbyterian Church of Warren Pennsylvania (hereinafter "Church"). 135 The orphans' court
held that the fifth paragraph failed to dispose of the 10% of the
residuary estate not specifically devised in the will and that the
undisposed 10% was to be distributed pro-rata between the five
36
residuary devisees.
The Church appealed this decision, arguing that the word "remaining" in the devise granting it 50% of the residue evidenced
the testatrix's intent for the Church to have whatever residue remained, including the putatively undisputed 10%.137 The Church
also asserted that the devise of 50% of the residuary estate was
merely a typographical error and that the testatrix's true intention was to devise 60% of the estate. 138 In opposition, the other
four residuary beneficiaries argued that a fifth 10% beneficiary
was omitted from the will, resulting in that portion of the estate
being undisposed of, in which case section 14(10) of the 1947 Act

should apply. 139
The majority stated that the language of McLaughlin's will did
not clearly evince an intent for the Church to take a 60% share of
the residuary estate. 140
As such, the court concluded that
McLaughlin had not disposed of the disputed 10% of her residuary
estate.141 Section 14(10) of the 1947 Act states that "when a devise or bequest as described in clause (9) hereof shall be included
in a residuary clause of the will . . . it shall pass to the other residuary devisees or legatees, if any there be, in proportion to their
respective shares or interests in the residue."'142 The court held
that section 14(10) was applicable to the unaccounted for 10% of
the estate because of the cross reference to clause (9) of the 1947
Act, which specifically includes those devises or bequests which

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

McLaughlin, 273 A.2d at 742.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 744.
Id.
Id.
McLaughlin, 273 A.2d at 744.

140.
141.

Id.
Id.

142.

Id. at 745 (citing 1947 Pa. Laws 89 (amended 1970)).
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are "undisposed of."' 143 Consequently, the court read sections 14(9)
and (10) as distributing the undisposed portion of McLaughlin's
estate "in proportion to their respective shares or interests in the
144
residue."
While the wording of the statutes controlling the disposition of
lapsed and void residuary devises has changed throughout the
past several decades, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's construc145
tion of these statutes remains steadfast. Prior to the Burger
opinion, the court had yet to interpret title 20, sections 2514 (10)
and (11) of the Code. The court took this opportunity to make the
determination that the original purpose for creating the statute in
1917,146 the abolition of the common law rule concerning lapsed
and void devises, remains the contemporary objective underlying
the current statute.
The disagreement underlying the holding in Burger concerned
the question of statutory construction. 147 The Orphans' Court of
Allegheny County, the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Justice
Eakin's concurrence all agreed that Janice Leckey lacked standing, not because the application of the statute prevented her from
taking under the will, but because it was reasonably certain that
Burger intended the gift to be distributed amongst the remaining
residuary beneficiaries in the event of failure due to undue influ148
ence.
The supreme court's ultimate decision in Burger, that the application of the anti-lapse statute is the appropriate means to determine whether or not Leckey lacked standing, hinged upon the
definition of "reasonably certain." If a court finds it reasonably
certain that a testator's intent was for the will, and not the statute, to apply in the event of a contingency, then the will controls
the disposition of the estate. 149 While the Burger court left unclear what the threshold for reasonably certain intent was, it concluded that Burger's intent fell short of such threshold. 150

143. Id.
144. McLaughlin, 273 A.2d at 745.
145. In re Estate of Burger, 898 A.2d 547 (Pa. 2006).
146. Armstrong Estate, 31 A.2d 528, 529 (Pa. 1943).
147. Burger, 898 A.2d at 558 (Eakin, J., concurring).
148. See generally Carothers's Estate, 150 A. 585, 586 (Pa. 1930) ("Where the contestant
to a will that is void in part receives no benefit from the contest he is not entitled to sustain
a caveat nor take an appeal from the action of the court below . .
149. In re Estate of Corbett, 241 A.2d 524, 527 (Pa. 1968).
150. Burger, 898 A.2d at 553 (majority opinion).
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Burger's will provided for an alternative disposition of his residuary estate only in the event of a beneficiary predeceasing him,
not for the contingency of undue influence. 151 The majority disagreed with the lower court's decision that this disposition met the
requisite reasonably certain intent standard. 152 Justice Saylor
noted that the superior court's decision was "in substantial tension
with the holdings of this Court to the effect that a circumstancespecific, alternative bequest is not, in and of itself, sufficient to
support a substitute gift occasioned by a different circumstance, at
153
least in the absence of some additional presumption."'
The majority's determination that "circumstance-specific, alternative bequest[s]" are insufficient evidence of "reasonably certain
intent" makes the application of section 2514 quite extensive.
This interpretation allows for the statute to apply to any contingency, such as undue influence not, contemplated by the testator
during the creation of the will. Justice Eakin's concurrence pointedly noted that "no one writes [his] will believing [he] [is] under
the undue influence of another; hence there is no reason to believe
that [he] would specifically address a situation [he] could not have
believed was of moment."'154 Consequently, his argument makes
the application of section 2514 inappropriate in situations where
the court determines that the testator would not have thought
about the occurrence of a particular event for whatever reason.
While Justice Eakin's argument is not without merit, it is clear
that the majority opinion was structured upon a theory of uniformity, which staunchly disapproves of judicial reformation of
wills. The supreme court's finding that the will in Burger presented insufficient evidence of "reasonably certain intent" supports the effort toward uniformly distributing estates where contingencies would otherwise require courts to rewrite wills. There
are a myriad of contingencies that a testator may fail to provide
for during the creation of his will. "Significantly, in this arena,
there is substantial room for disagreement as to what presumptions are most appropriate" when there is a failure to anticipate
55
the happening of an event which in fact occurs. 1
In order to provide a uniform and fair presumption in the event
that the testator fails to provide for the happening of a certain
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 550.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id. at 558 (Eakin, J., concurring).
Burger, 898 A.2d at 554.
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event, the court noted that the most appropriate way to approach
the situation is to "assume that the testator simply did not anticipate this happening."'156 In making this assumption, the court
finds it reasonable to implement the "pre-existing, legislatively
prescribed rules of interpretation that were available to the testator for consideration at the time that the will was drafted, as opposed to crafting subsequent, judicial presumptions that are independent of the statute," 157 as Justice Eakin would have it.
This sweeping exclusion from the phrase "reasonably certain"
allowed the Burger court to reach its current interpretation of
clauses (10) and (11) of title 20 section 2514.158 In Armstrong Estate,159 Justice Stearne noted "the court's tendency to interpret
statutes liberally whenever the evil appears which it was obviously itended to prevent. The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth
life."'160 In its holding in Burger,the majority of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court continued to be consistent with the Commonwealth's advancement of the policy against intestacy that evolved
at common law. Future novel constructions of clause (11) will be
futile now that the court has solidified a concrete interpretation of
the statute in its contemporary form. It can now be said that the
letter of the statute does not kill, but, along with the spirit,
breathes life into its underlying purpose.
SaraA. Miller
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